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Abstract: This article reveals, by studying correlative relationships between US regime support
and regime properties, that the US foreign policy in the Middle East has traditionally helped
governments to limit the political participation of Islamists, communists, enemies of Israel and
populations  that  could  be  hostile  to  the  US oil  interests.  This  way  the  US economic  and
strategic  security  interests  have  contributed  to  human  insecurity  in  the  region.  With  the
exception of  the last  interest,  the US has relaxed its  support  for  repression of  the above-
mentioned groups. This seems to be one of the international factors that made the Arab Spring
possible.  
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1. Introduction
Human  security  of  individuals  depends  on many
things, not just on political systems. Yet,  restrictions
to political  participation, lack of openness and com-
petitiveness of  executive recruitment,  and especially
the lack of constraints on the chief executive's policies
and actions all predict authoritarian violence, which is
definitely  a  threat  to  human  security.  According  to
Rudoph Rummel,  more  than six  times  more people
were killed by their governments than by all the wars
combined during the 20th century [1]. In this sense,
the  fall  of  brutal  autocrats  during  the  Arab  Spring
constituted progress for human security. 
Human  security  and  the  change  of  a  repressive
government can be brought about in many ways. In
the Arab Spring ordinary people took center stage. At
the  same  time,  political  discourse  on  the  Respon-
sibility to Protect (R2P), let alone the discourses giving
legitimacy to international military interventions in the
name  of  democracy,  also  highlight  the  role  of
international  state  actors  in  the  promotion,  and
destruction of human security. Recently up to 60% of
people killed in wars were killed by wars (Libya, Iraq
and Afghanistan) that were justified by references to
human  security,  democracy  and  human  rights
(calculated  by  the  author  on  the  basis  of  best
estimates for 2011, the last year of the data published
yet  [2]).  This  is  why it  is  still  relevant  to ask how
states  really  influence  each  other  and what  human
security implications this influence could really have.
This  article  will  focus  on  these  questions  in  the
context of the Arab Spring and argues that the ending
of the US support of authoritarian suppression of the
© 2013 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published 
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political  participation  of  Islamists  and  anti-Israel
movements in the Arab world could have affected the
downfall  of  autocracy  in  several  Arab  countries.
Furthermore, this article argues that greater openness
provided by WikiLeaks about this change in the US
policy possibly triggered this change.
2. Earlier Studies and the Argument of This 
Study
The successful toppling of autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya (and Yemen) has often been attributed to the
popular motives of opposing despots.  The failure to
bring  about  development  (legitimacy  by  means  of
performance) has been pointed to by several scholars
[3–8]. Filipe Campante and Davin Chor and Katerina
Dalacoura  specify  the  argument  by  showing  that
grievances, especially that of unemployment, held by
well-educated people foreshadow problems for auto-
crats  [9,10].  According  to  Samuel  Huntington  "The
higher the level of education of the unemployed,…the
more  extreme  the  destabilizing  behavior  which
results" [11]. In addition to unemployment, economic
policies  that  discriminate  against  the  well-educated
middle class have been associated with the success of
change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya [12]. 
Nonetheless, grievances that motivate and initiate
revolts can also be purely political. Abrams applied the
logic of relative deprivation to political grievances by
explaining  the  appraisals  of  the  Middle  East  as  a
response to the increasingly violent repression of the
non-violent  political  opposition  and  also  to  the
reversal of the modest beginnings of early democratic
signs [11].
Some  explanations  emphasize  the  resources  and
opportunities of the potential rebels. This article will
focus exactly on the modalities of democratic revolt.
People  are  able  to  topple  autocratic  regimes,  only
when the autocrat fails  to keep his/her order intact
[13] and  this  condition  is  partly  dependent  on
whether or not the opposition has the resources, the
education and the time for mounting such a challenge
[9,14]. The availability of new communication media
with  Facebook,  text  messaging  etc.  have  been
considered  to  have  been  among  the  facilitators  of
change in the Middle East [4,14–17].  In contrast, an
ideational  emancipation,  the  ability  to  imagine
democratic models that are not copied from American
textbooks on political science, has also been seen as a
necessary condition to the process of democratization
[18]. Finally,  a  successful  challenging  of  the  rulers
also  required  the  political  awakening  of  the  young
people  [15,16,18],  and  the  political  (rather  than
militant) mobilization of religious groups.  The wisdom
of Przeworsky  [19] about the impact on perceptions
of  the  feasibility  of  democratic  revolution  in
democratizing regions was also utilized in the analyses
of  the  opportunities  available  for  the  toppling  of
autocrats in the Middle East [20].
3. External Action…and Inaction
Opportunities for a democratic change are not always
created domestically.  External  political  influence and
intervention  in  domestic  power  battles  is  another
factor that affects the opportunities of peoples who
might have other motives for toppling their respective
autocratic regimes. On the one hand, much attention
has recently been paid to international efforts to help
the  opposition  topple  their  despots.  Vali  Nasr,  for
example,  criticizes  Obama's  administration  for
rejecting the initiatives of  the State Department  for
greater activism in support of democracy. Instead, he
claims,  the  White  House is  "in  a  retreat"  from the
region  [21].  At  the  same  time  these  efforts  at
democratization often end up as imperialism that does
not  serve  the  human security  in  dictatorships  [22].
This article will  focus precisely on those inputs into
those  opportunities  that  topple  autocrats  that
emanate  from  the  political  interventions  into  the
domestic  power  struggles  of  democratizing  states
made by the big powers. Seven out of the ten most
spectacular changes towards democracy that occurred
after  the  First  World  War  were  at  least  partly
influenced  by  international  manipulation  of  the
military power balance of the affected country  [23].
However, in most cases the change was related to the
ending of support for an autocrat by a foreign power.
In Latin America, the US support of autocrats ended
with the human rights campaign of President Jimmy
Carter,  and  with  the  anti-drug  warfare  of  President
Ronald  Reagan  and  what  followed  was  a  wave  of
democratization throughout the region. The wave of
democratization in Eastern Europe, again, was made
possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
support for the communist autocrats. The ending of
the Soviet intervention for the communist autocrats in
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia
resulted  in  the  democratization  of  half  of  the  ten
countries  that  had  experienced  the  most  profound
democratization after the First World War [23].
4. Can It Be the WikiLeaks?
The question related to foreign impacts is,  whether
there was a foreign power that withdrew its support
from  the  autocrats.  If  such  support  from  a  power
existed in the Middle East, it had to be from the US
since only the American influence can have had such
a decisive role in the shaping of polities in the region.
A  thesis  that  this  was  the  case  has  already  been
presented.  Ruthie  Blum surprisingly  accuses the US
for abandoning its autocratic allies and thus making
available space for anti-Israeli Islamists to take over
[24].  In  contrast,  other  scholars  have  been  more
critical of the US with its support for autocrats in the
past, and more recently they have been critical of the
US  policy  that  has  not  supported  the  democratic
movements sufficiently  [21],  and these scholars are
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now pleased to have seen the autocrats overthrown.
The thesis of the Arab Spring being influenced by the
refusal  of  the US to  support  its  old allies  was well
presented  by  the  advocacy  group  of  the  main
whistleblower,  WikiLeaks.  This  organization allegedly
leaked the information about the unwillingness of the
US to  continue its  support  for  President  Ben  Ali  in
Tunis:
"The US campaign of unwavering public support for
President Ali led to a widespread belief among the
Tunisian people that  it  would be very difficult  to
dislodge  the  autocratic  regime  from  power.  This
view was shattered when leaked (WikiLeaks) cables
exposed the US government's private assessment:
that the US would not support the regime in the
event  of  a  popular  uprising.  While  extreme
economic  hardship  and  popular  discontent  with
(human) rights abuses had already set the stage
for  an  uprising,  this  new  information  played  a
critical  role  in  transforming  the  landscape  of
political possibilities in Tunisia. The Tunisian people
finally  realized  that,  contrary  to  the  US
government's public relations efforts, they weren't
really  up  against  the  full  force  of  the  world's
superpower" [25,26].
Could  it  be  that  the  main  international  push  for
democratization in the Middle East came as a negative
act? The negative act, or non-action in this case was
the refusal of the US to continue support for Ben Ali
against his democratic challengers. In Egypt the US
abandoned  President  Hosni  Mubarak,  who until  the
turmoil  had received financial support matched only
by  the  US  support  for  Israel.  In  Libya  the  United
States participated in a military operation involving the
heavy  bombing  of  Muammar  Gaddafi's  troops.  In
contrast, during President George W. Bush's regime,
the  country  solicited  Libyan  support  in  the  war  on
terror, tried to persuade Gaddafi to accept intelligence
sharing arrangements and hoped to add Libya to the
Trans-Sahara  Counter-Terrorism  Partnership  [27]:  a
venture that was undoubtedly aimed against some of
the individuals in the current Libyan government. It is
not within the scope of this article to prove that the
US policy towards some of its Middle Eastern allies,
especially in the war against terror, has dramatically
changed.  Instead,  this  is  taken as  a given.  Such a
change is considered to be a subject that this article
will  not  analyze.  In  addition,  no  proof  for  the
argument  that  the  sudden  inaction  of  the  US
regarding support of its autocratic allies was one of
the reasons for the emergence of the opportunity for
the Arab Spring will  be provided either. Instead the
topic that this article will focus on, is the question of
whether the former US policy indeed contributed to
the durability of Middle East autocracy.
Thus, the main question this article tries to answer
is whether or not it is true that former US support of
regimes in the Middle East supported autocrats more
than  it  did  democrats.  If  the  answer  to  this
controversial  question  is  no,  then  it  will  not  be
possible  to  say  that  the  ending  of  such  support
contributed to the toppling of autocrats. Only if  the
overall balance of US interference and intervention in
domestic  affairs  of  the Middle  East  tilts  in  favor  of
autocracy,  can US inaction be said actually  to have
helped to oust the dictators. This is why this article
focuses on the question of what the overall balance of
US support to domestic forces was: Was the support
of  the  US  in  general  in  favor  of  democrats  or
dictators?
5. Quantitative Design
In order to answer this challenging research question,
it  is  necessary  for  the  analysis  to  go  beyond  gut
feelings  and  qualitative  analysis  that  aim  at
quantitative conclusions.  It  is  known that  there  are
cases  where  the  US  has  supported  democratic
regimes  and  there  are  cases  where  the  US  has
supported  autocrats.  Of  these  claims  there  are  no
doubts.  Nevertheless,  the  crucial  question  is  which
pattern is  the rule  and which is  the exception with
regard  to  US  interaction  with  the  countries  of  the
Middle  East.  In  addition  to  revealing  incidents  and
support and opposition of different types of regimes,
one  needs  to  reveal  how  often  the  US  influence
supported  autocrats,  and  how  often  it  supported
democrats. This can be done by correlating data on
polities with data on US military support and political
support for regimes. The Polity IV dataset will be used
for  the  data  on polities.  This  database is  the  most
used data on polities among specialists of comparative
study  of  democratization.  The  definitions  and
operationalizations of the variables that will be used in
this  article  will  be  discussed  as  and  when  these
variables  are  introduced.  The  data  on  US  support
have been derived from historical  analyses that  will
not  be  discussed  here.  However,  for  the  sake  of
transparency, the coding of Middle East countries to
various  contemporaneous  categories  of  US  support
during  the  years  after  the  Second  World  War  are
shown in Appendixes 1 and 2 of this article.
Previously,  I  examined  the  relationship  between
changes in polities and changes in the qualities and
quantities  of  US  support  [28].  My  conclusions
suggested  that  the  US  has  generally  rewarded
changes towards autocracy whereas it has punished
democratization.  Examination  of  the  events  reveal
that  this  was  because  the  processes  of
democratization  have  often  been  spearheaded  by
groups who are either against Israel, against the US
economic  interests  (mainly  oil-related),  or  are
geopolitically  problematic  as  Islamists  or  socialists
[28]. However, this time  I wish to establish whether
US support  for  regimes has been important  for  the
stability of autocrats per se (and whether the ending
of such support can be a crucial reason for the Arab
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Spring). It is also important to analyze how support
and  autocracy  correlate,  i.e.  what  is  the  overall
balance of US influence with regards to autocracy in
the Middle East. Thus, the hypothesis of this study is
that it is possible that the ending of US support for
autocrats  facilitated  the  Arab  Spring  because  the
overall influence of the US regional power previously
was in support of autocracy. 
The temporal focus of this examination begins from
the  beginning  of  independence  of  the  Middle  East
countries  and also after  the US became hegemonic
over the region, i.e. after the Second World War. This
analysis period ends at the end of the year 2010, the
last year of Polity IV at the time of writing this article.
Using the year 2010 as the last year of the analysis
also reveals the policy of the US before the beginning
of the Arab Spring. For this reason, the decision for
using the year 2010 as the last year for analyzing the
research question, is academically robust.
In my quantitative analysis I will reveal two sets of
results, one dataset in which Turkey is treated as a
Middle East nation, and the other in which Turkey is
not treated as a member of the region. Iran is another
borderline state. Yet it is more often than not included
in the region of the Middle East and this is why I will
also  consider  it  as  a  Middle  Eastern  power  in  my
analysis.  After  all,  in  political  terms Iran  is  a  most
central actor in Middle East politics, and its experience
of US influence is  crucial  in the construction of the
political  reality  of  power  in  the  Middle  East  region.
Iran, as one of the members of the "axis of evil" and
the group of "tyrannies", has been central to the US
argument for the need to interfere in domestic policies
in  order  "to  rescue  populations".   The  focus  is  on
Muslim  countries,  as  this  is  the  cultural  and
geographic  area where  the Arab Spring took place.
Lebanon has not been dominated by Muslim regimes
even though currently Muslims constitute a majority
of about 60% of the population. Lebanon is naturally
included in  the  Muslim Middle  East  area  due to  its
integral affiliation within the group of the Middle East
states. Since the study leaves out the examination of
Israel (since the focus in on Muslim countries), there
is an inherent bias against US policies of support for
democracy:  Israel  is  a  democracy  (within  its  core
territory),  and  the  US  tends  to  support  Israeli
governments.
6. US Support for Democracy…and Autocratic 
Violence
Democracy  in  this  article  can  be  defined  as  the
following  essential  interdependent  elements:  open-
ness  and  competitiveness  in  executive  recruitment,
and competitive and regulated political participation.
Autocracy,  in  this  article,  is  defined  by  the  lack  of
competitiveness  of  political  participation,  the  reg-
ulation  of  participation,  the  lack  of  openness  and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the lack
of  constraints  on  the  chief  executive's  policies  and
actions.  Both  the  Democracy  and  the  Autocracy
indicator used here are an additive 11-point scale (0–
10). These definitions follow the operationalizations of
the Polity dataset [29,30]. It is important to note that
autocracy and democracy are not mutually exclusive:
a country that  allows a lot  of  popular  participation,
but  rules  without  constraints  can  be  relatively
autocratic  at  the  same  time  as  being  relatively
democratic.  The  US  military  relationship  means  US
military aid or concessional sales of military hardware
for  regimes  that  enable  them to  maintain  law  and
order. The US general assistance to the regime means
political  support  for  the  regime  in  the  form  of
economic aid, diplomatic support or positive publicity
for  the  regime.  The  coding  of  political  and military
support can be accessed in Appendixes 1 and 2. 
7. US Support in the Middle East Including 
Turkey
Before going into correlative analysis one should make
a  methodological  reservation  here.  To  assess  the
significance  of  correlations  one  should  focus  on
observations  that  are  independent  of  each  other.
However, if the country is a democracy this year it is
likely to have been a democracy the year before and it
is  likely  to  be a democracy the  following year.  The
same  is  true  for  US  support.  Yet,  correlations  are
relevant  regardless  of  the interdependence between
observations  of  each  country  over  time  as  we  are
interested in whether US influence is currently helping
autocrats or democrats, rather than in whether there
is a systematic causal relationship between autocracy
and US support. Even if it can be predicted that if the
US supports one autocratic regime this year, then this
regime will still be autocratic and that the US will still
support it the following year, support over the years
for a particular autocrat does affect the US's overall
balance of support between democrats and autocrats.
There  is  a  very  weak  but  highly  significant
correlation (0.111**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054) between
US general support (non-military support) for regimes
and democracy. However, such a correlation is missing
between  democracy  and  US  military  support  for
regimes.  However,  there  is  a  stronger  and  more
significant correlation between US general help to a
regime and the regime's authoritarian character, which
is  more  crucial  for  human  security  (0.171**,  sign.
0.000, N = 1054). Thus in general, US general sup-
port  has  a  highly  significant,  albeit  weak,  negative
correlation with overall polity quality (–0.165**, sign.
0.000, N = 1054), which indicates that over the study
period  the  US  supported  autocracies  more  than
democracies.  Furthermore,  US  military  support  and
authoritarianism were  highly  significant,  even  when
they were weakly correlated (0.114**, sign. 0.000, N =
1055). The US then, weakly supports popular partic-
ipation, but it supports harsh measures taken by the
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authorities  and  thereby  supports  human  insecurity
more.  Furthermore,  it  seems  that  US  support  has
targeted regimes with some competitive participation,
but  where  the  security  apparatus  of  the  regimes
restrict the openness of participation. Before going on
to a more detailed analysis of the profiles of polities
that US support for regimes favor, let us look at the
archetypal regime that the US supports or opposes.
A  typical  US-supported  country  with  democracy
score  of  1  was  Tunisia  before  the  Arab  Spring,
whereas a typical country opposed by the US with a
democracy score 0, was the Sudan. 
The first observation of these data is that the mean
scores for democracy in the Middle East area are very
low (clearly  below the global averages) whereas the
level of autocracy is high (way above global averages).
The  second  observation,  before  making  the
comparison between supported and opposed regimes,
is that it seems that neutral countries that are neither
supported  nor  opposed  by  the  US,  perform  slightly
better in terms of their development of democracy. This
is clearer the closer we come to the present. Neutral
regimes tend to be countries that are relatively smaller
in importance for global energy production and/or are
situated  in  less  strategic  locations.  Competition
between the global great powers has not served the
human  security  of  peoples  of  economically  or
strategically important countries very well.
The third observation that can be made about the
contents of Table 1 is that the data confirm the result
of  the  correlation  analysis.  The  US  supports  both
participatory and authoritarian regimes. The countries
that the US opposes tend to be less authoritarian and
thus the better at protecting their  own people from
authoritarian  violence.  Moreover,  neutral  countries
score  better  than  those  countries  that  the  US
supports. Morocco (1992–1997) after its constitutional
reform of 1992 and its slow democratic progress is a
typical  US-supported  autocracy  (with  an  autocracy
score  7).  Sudan  at  the  beginning  of  the  new
millennium  (2002–2004)  is  a  typical  US-opposed
country,  with  an  autocracy  score  of  6.  Two  typical
neutral countries with an autocracy score of 6 were
Egypt during the last years of Anwar Sadat and Oman
before the discovery of oil in the mid-1960s.  These
relevant periods occurred before the development of
US relations and the intensification of authoritarianism
with these two countries. 
Table 1. Mean democracy, authoritarianism and
US general  support  scores  in  the  Middle  East,
1946–2010.
Mean level of 
Democracy
Mean level of 
Autocracy
US opposes 0.30 6.41
US does not support or oppose 1.29 6.38
US supports 1.06 6.94
The same pattern applies to US military support.
The US tends  to support  more democratic  but  also
more  autocratic  regimes  than  it  opposes.  The
differences between militarily supported countries and
those that get no military support are smaller than in
the case of general support. Consequently, it  seems
that US military support is even less selective than US
general  support  when  one  looks  at  the  general
indicatorsof democracy and authoritarianism. However,
once we look at democracy and autocracy profiles we
will realize that this is not the case, after all.
8. US Support in the Middle East Not Including 
Turkey
Even  though  US  support  for  autocracy  is  more
systematic  that  its  support  for  democracy,  the
difference between the two is not great. However, if
we take a narrower geographical look at the Middle
East  area  (Table  2)  and  assume  that  the  regional
rationale of support for the NATO ally, Turkey, derives
from European rather  than Middle  Eastern  realities,
the picture of US policies in the Middle East gets darker.
Suddenly, the difference in democratic credentials
between  US-supported  and  US-opposed  regimes
disappears.  Moreover,  a  typical  US-supported  polity
has  an  autocracy  score  of  eight  whereas  a  typical
opposed or neutral country has a score of six.  The
picture with military support is even worse (Table 3).
An average Middle East country receiving US military
assistance is clearly less democratic and much more
authoritarian  than a country  that  is  not  involved in
military cooperation with the US.
9. The Difference between President Bush and 
President Obama
After the end of the Cold War and especially after the
War  on  Terror  had  begun,  the  discourse  on
humanitarian intervention gained political capital, and
thus  respect  for  national  sovereignty  declined.  This
does not, however, mean that the consistency of US
support for human security is greater once there is a
greater need to pursue policies that compromise state
sovereignty. Furthermore, the priorities of the War on
Terror  also  required  continued  support  for  pro-US
autocracies such as Saudi Arabia. An examination of
the presidency of the George W. Bush period (Table 4)
reveals how counter-terrorism affected US support to
the Middle East regimes. By way of contrast I will add
the figures during the first two years of the presidency
of Barrack Obama in parenthesis.
Clearly,  the  region  has  become  less  autocratic.
Since the comparison here is between countries that
the US supports and the ones US opposes, the general
development  towards  democracy,  especially  during
the  past  few years  does  not  affect  the  conclusion
about how the US supports democracy and autocracy.
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Table  2. Mean  democracy,  autocracy  and  US
general support scores in the Middle East (excl.
Turkey), 1946–2010.
Democracy Autocracy
US opposes 0.30 6.41
US does not support or oppose 1.26 6.41
US supports 0.35 7.61
Table  3. Mean  democracy,  autocracy  and  US
military support scores in the Middle East (excl.
Turkey), 1946–2010.
Democracy Autocracy
No military support 0.72 6.63
Military support 0.31 7.80
Table  4. Mean  democracy,  autocracy  and  US
general  support  scores  in  the  Middle  East,  for
the G. W. Bush and (B. Obama) presidencies.
Democracy Autocracy
Enemies 0.75 (0.17) 5.34 (5.83)
Neutral 2.67 (4.00) 5.00 (4.00)
Allies 1.07 (1.33) 6.05 (5.63)
The  general  democratization  happened  before  the  US
policy changed as, during the term of President Bush, the
countries  supported by the US still  were  clearly  more
autocratic than those the US treated with suspicion and
hostility. The trend in US support did not change before
the change over to the Obama presidency. During the
Bush presidency the United States still supported regimes
that  governed  with  slightly  greater  democracy  than it
opposed.  Nonetheless,  the  US  also  supported  slightly
more authoritarian  regimes than that  it  opposed.  The
margin between the democracy scores of those supported
and  those  opposed  diminished,  whereas  the  margin
between autocracy scores of US friends and foes slightly
widened  during  the  George  W.  Bush  presidency.  US
support scores for the George W. Bush era became even
less supportive of citizens when measured by support for
democracy and autocracy. If Turkey is excluded from the
analysis,  the difference between the times before and
during President G. W. Bush is substantial. Then the US
clearly opposes more democratic regimes than it supports
(Table 5).
However,  the  Obama  presidency  is  different.  The
preference for autocrats  virtually no longer exists in the
Obama presidency. 
The presidency of George W. Bush was disastrous for
US legitimacy as a supporter of democracy in the Middle
East when US policy is interrogated from the perspective
of military support (Table 6). Regardless of whether or
not we count Turkey as a Middle Eastern power, the G.
W.  Bush  era  supported  more  regimes  with  a  worse
democracy  score  and  a  higher  level  of  autocracy
compared to regimes the US did not support.  If  one
looks at Table 6 on the Middle East without Turkey the
picture is grim.
As the figures in parentheses for  the first  years of
President Obama show, US policy towards democracy is
fluid. It seems that the autocratic bias has not changed in
US  military  relationships  (Table  6),  whereas  for  US
general  support the bias towards supporting autocratic
regimes has disappeared  (Tables 4 and 5). The Obama
administration's  policy did  give different  signals  to  the
Arabs who disapproved of  or  opposed their  autocratic
leaders.
10. Profiles of Democracy and Autocracy
If we then move from the blunt variables of democracy
and autocracy scores towards variables that detail polities,
we  can  illuminate  some  of  the  hidden  interests  and
drivers behind US support or opposition. US supportive
relationship  for  a  Middle  East  regime  is  correlatively
associated with high levels of regulation of chief executive
recruitment. Furthermore, US support was not given to
countries with a long history of military coups (even if the
US has backed a few of them itself). Regulation of the
recruitment of the chief executive of a country does not
imply either democracy or authoritarianism, but stability.
Hereditary  succession  can  be  as  regulated  as  institu-
tionalized elections. The correlation between US support
and  the  degree  of  regulation  of  chief  executive
recruitment is the highest and most significant association
in this study. This association is also a characteristic of the
target country's polity regardless of whether we look at
general  support  (0.451**,  sign.  0.000,  N = 1054)  or
military cooperation (0.386**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055).
Regulation of executive recruitment was an even more
vital  criterion  under  President  G.  W. Bush's  tenure  as
president. Clearly US support strives for stability rather
than democracy or the well-being of citizens of the Middle
East countries. This seems explicable, given the economic
and strategic interests the US faces in the Middle East.
This  emphasis  is  often  central  to  US  definitions  and
objectives  of  its  Middle  Eastern  strategy:  "The United
States has pursued a foreign policy that seeks stability in
a region with abundant energy reserves but which has
volatile  interstate  relationships"  [31]. Furthermore,  US
strategic interests in an area that neighbored the Soviet
Union required that a military relationship had to have
some  stability.  US  support  is  also  very  significantly
correlated with the duration of regimes, which in turn, are
associated with the predictability of developments and the
stability of the situation. For example, the emphasis on
stability in US relations with Egypt and Tunisia continued
until the very end of President George W. Bush's stint as
president. The assessment at the end of 2010 was that
the US could no longer go against people who yearned
for democracy and wanted to oust President Ben Ali. This
revelation was disclosed by WikiLeaks in January 2011
and it was an indication of a priority change in US foreign
policy in favor of giving at least some room for human
rights  and  human  security,  even  if  this  meant
compromising the "stability-interests" of the US.
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Table  5. Mean  democracy,  autocracy  and  US
general support scores in the Middle East (excl.
Turkey), G.W. Bush and (B. Obama) Presidencies.
Democracy Autocracy
Enemies 0.75 (0.17) 5.34 (5.83)
Neutral 2.67 (4.00) 5.00 (4.00)
Allies 0.54 (0.80) 6.43 (6.00)
Table  6. Mean  democracy,  autocracy  and  US
military support scores in the Middle East (excl.
Turkey), G. W. Bush and (Obama) Presidencies.
Democracy Autocracy
No military relations 1.14 (1.58) 5.16 (5.08)
Military relations 0.49 (0.78) 6.63 (6.09)
Despite  the  poor  democracy  record  of  the  US
supported  regimes,  the  level  of  competitiveness  in
executive recruitment and the level of competitiveness
in political participation in Middle East states on the
one hand and US military support on the other are
clearly  correlated  (competitiveness  of  executive
recruitment: 0.241**, sign. 0.000, N = 1055; compet-
itiveness  of  political  participation:  0.160**,  sign.
0.000,  N = 1055) and with general  support on the
other hand (competitiveness of executive recruitment:
0.267**, sign. 0.000, N = 1054; competitiveness of
political participation: 0.128**, sign. 0.000, N=1054)
are significantly, albeit very weakly, correlated. Clearly
the  centrality  of  democratic  competition  in  the
American policy can be seen.
Although  competitive  regimes  are  supported,  US
support is correlated with constraints on the openness
of this competition. Executive recruitment and political
participation  might  be  competitive,  but  not  all  can
participate in this competition. The openness of the
executive  recruitment  concept  has  the  strongest
negative  correlation  with  US  support,  both  general
and military (general support: –0.336**, sign. 0.000,
N = 1054; military support: –0.254**, sign. 0.000, N
= 1055). An examination of the autocracies that the
US has supported and opposed reveals what kind of
restrictions  to  democratic  participation  the  US
supports.  Recruitment  and political  participation  are
not open as Communists, Islamists and people who
would be  harmful to US political interests in terms of
policy  towards  oil,  are  often  excluded  from  the
political process.
The  problem  of  the  lack  of  openness  is  also
understandable from the point of view of US strategic
and  economic  interests.  Even  when  the  US  is
ideologically  committed  to  supporting  competitive
political  systems,  it  cannot  allow  ideological
expressions  that  harm  its  oil  interests  or  strategic
priorities  within  the  Middle  East.  However,  when
emphasizing abstract strategic security interests, the
US has traditionally contributed to human insecurity
inside Middle Eastern autocracies.
11. US Support and Democracy and Human 
Rights: Extreme Cases
The  rationales  of  US  support  for  elements  of
autocracy  namely:  the  bias  towards  autocratic
stability  and  the  imposition  of  restrictions  on
political  participation  and  the  competition  for
executive positions against Islamists, Israel-haters,
Communists and opponents of US oil interests, can
also be examined by looking at the extreme cases
of  US support  for  autocrats  and its  opposition  to
democrats.  If  we  list  regimes  that  the  United
States has supported and put them in the order of
their  autocracy  score  from the  most  to  the  least
autocratic regimes, at the top of the list we would
get the extreme cases that the US should not have
supported if it were interested in the promotion of
human security. This is what I have done in  Table
7:  the  cut-off  point  is  the  autocracy  score  10,
which is the highest level of autocracy in the Polity
data.  All  the  regimes  listed below belong to  that
category.
I now order the data for countries the US opposed
in the order of their autocracy scores, starting from
the least autocratic countries, in Table 8.
Table  7. Most  autocratic regimes that  US has
supported.
Country Regime years Autocracy score
Iran 1953–1978 10
Jordan 1974–1983 10
Saudi Arabia 1946–2010 10
Kuwait 1976–1989 10
Bahrain 1971–1992 10
Qatar 1985–2010 10
Oman 1973–1990 10
Table  8. Least autocratic  regimes that the US
has opposed.
Country Regime years Autocracy score
Sudan 1967–1968 1
Iran 1997–2003 1
Lebanon 2005 1
Yemen North 1967–1972 3
Yemen 2005 3
Sudan 2005–2010 4
Iran 1951–1952 4
Iraq 1958–1967 5
Yemen South 1969 5
Sudan 2002–2004 6
Iraq 1982–1996; 2004–2010 6
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Many of the regimes (of Table 8) demonized in the
Western media are nowhere near as autocratic as all
of the US allies of Table 7. In fact every one of the
regimes listed, including the currently much maligned
Iranian and Sudanese governments, is less autocratic
than the average Muslim regime that the US supports
in the Middle East. Not even the two most autocratic
regimes  that  US  has  opposed in  the  past,  Saddam
Hussein's  Iraq or  the socialist,  pro-Soviet  regime of
Algeria of the mid-1960s ever had an autocracy score
of 10.
Each  of  the  US-supported  regimes  that  had  an
autocracy score 10 were major oil producers, and all
of  them  have  or  have  had  a  stable  but  ruthless
political system. The US is addicted to oil, and it sells
out  its  principles  of  human security  to  get  what  it
needs, as any addict would.
It  seems from Table  8 that  the  US has  opposed
relatively  less-autocratic  countries  when  a)  their
popular will  went against the crucial interests of US
energy  policies  (Iran  1951–1952  being  the  best
example), and US global missions against communism
(South  Yemen  1969)  or  against  Islamic  terrorism
(Iran,  1997–2008,  Sudan  2002–2008),  or  b)  when
their  relations  with  the  US  were  severed  by  them
having a negative stand on Israel (Sudan 1967–1968).
The pursuance of such opposition has often occurred
in  ways  that  undermine  the  principle  of  human
security.
If  we  look  at  the  countries  for  which  Barack
Obama's regime relaxed its rule of supporting stable
regimes, and allowed people to topple their leaders,
we can see that  these  countries  were  not  crucially
important oil  producers.  Their  respective democratic
oppositions  were  moderately  Islamist  and  they  did
oppose Israel, but the Arab Spring in these countries
never threatened the US oil interests. It seems that
Obama could tolerate human security progress even
in countries that were likely to turn Islamist and anti-
Israel. However, the US war on terror was not to be
compromised,  and thus  popular  pressures were  not
allowed  to  hamper  US  operations  in  Yemen.  In
addition, popular preferences were still suppressed in
those US allied countries in which the promotion of
such preferences could have helped the geopolitical
interests  of  Iran  (such  as  in  Iraq  and  Bahrain).
However,  US  resolve  was  most  unyielding  in  the
countries  in  which  the  US  energy  interests  where
threatened (Bahrain and Saudi Arabia). Whether the
new  energy  solutions  that  will  reduce  US  energy
dependence on the Middle East will affect this driver
for the support of stable but autocratic regimes of oil
producing nations remains to be seen.
12. Conclusions and Discussion
Comparison  of  polity  profiles  of  regimes  that  the
United States either supports or opposes in addition
to an analysis of the extreme cases of US support and
opposition  seem  to  produce  the  same  conclusions.
The main conclusions of this study support the view
which can be summarized as follows: 
1. In  general,  the  United  States  has  supported
more autocratic  regimes  than it  has  opposed.  In
this sense US support  of  regimes seems to have
contributed to human insecurity.
2. In general the US military relationship facilitated
autocratic  governments,  i.e.  governments  whose
polity allows for a more brutal oppression of their
people  than  those  regimes  for  which  the  US
eschews such a military relationship. 
3. The US supports seven regimes with the highest
autocracy score of 10: i.e. regimes that are more
autocratic  than  the  most  autocratic  regimes  that
the US has opposed. 
4. Many  of  the  countries  that  the  US  has  been
most  passionate in opposing,  i.e.  those countries
that  the  US  policy  most  frequently  denies  the
normal  diplomatic  rights  to  which  all  sovereign
nations  are  due,  are  relatively  democratic  and
much  less  autocratic  than  the  countries  the  US
supports in general.
The polity profiles of the regimes that the US either
supports  or  opposes  in  the  Middle  East  provide
important explanations as to why the balance of US
influence  in  domestic  policies  in  the  Middle  East
countries favors autocratic governments. The analysis
above  corroborates  the  findings  based  on  the
observation  of  polity  changes  and  the  qualitative
analysis  published  by  Marwan  Bishara  and  myself
[28,32]. According to Bishara, support for autocrats is
because  the  US  sees  the  Middle  East  through  the
prism of oil, Israel, and terrorism, and that all of these
viewpoints are impediments to the US commitment to
pursuing democracy, human rights and freedom [32].
The  US  preferred  the  controlled  chief  executive
recruitment  in  Middle  East  countries,  especially  in
those countries where there was a risk of communists
(during the cold war), Islamists (during the War on
Terror), or haters of Israel taking over. The US also
supported the durability of these polities, especially in
oil producing countries. Clearly, all of these factors are
decisive in what lies behind the traditional US support
for autocrats in the Middle East.
The  oil  and  gas-related  interests  for  supporting
autocrats can be understood easily by integrating this
observation with the literature of political economy. Oil
is  important  to  the  US  strategically,  whereas  oil
interests also affect the behavior of the US towards
Middle East states due to the influence wielded by the
oil companies.
Oil  is  a  strategic  commodity  and  a  necessity  of
modern industry, thus access to oil-based energy has
long  been  crucial  for  the  strategic  and  economic
interests of the United States. In addition to it being a
necessity  for  American  prosperity,  it  has  been
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instrumental in the setting of strategic goals, including
the  ability  of  the  US to  promote  democracy  in  the
world.  This  paradox between US economic interests
with regards to oil and the wider espoused US global
strategic goal of democracy was made very explicit in
the previous US president's (George W. Bush) analysis
of  US  policies  on  the  Middle  East  [31].  This
dichotomous  linkage  between  strategy  and  support
for oil autocrats explains the approach of the US in
limiting popular  expression in favor  of  Islamism (or
Iran), and communism.
In addition to global interests, energy influences US
policies about protecting the investments of American
oil  companies  in  Middle  Eastern  oil.  Oil  exploration
requires a huge investment before it starts producing
any profits and after this initial investment the assets
of the investors are fixed and immobile and therefore
at the mercy of any change in policy. Consequently, it
is clear that the investor is keen on rules that enable
the  continuation  of  the  business.  According  to
Hirschman  [33],  this  creates  a  situation  where  the
investor is left with the strategy of trying to influence
the host country: leaving the country is not an option.
When the investment is crucial to national interest, it
is likely that the logic of power forces the country of
the  investor  to  pursue  strategies  that  aim  at
controlling the polity of the host country. It does so to
ameliorate the vulnerability of strategically important
investments.  The strong support given by the United
States to friendly dictators (regimes listed in Table 7),
the American preference for controlled chief executive
recruitment  in  host  countries,  the  support  for  the
continuity of favorable polities in oil countries testify
to this logic of immobile, fixed assets that explain the
interventions of US interests in securing access to oil
in the Middle East.
In addition to vital pressing economic motives, US
policy  has  to  adjust  regional  approaches  to  global
priorities and this necessarily implies compromises to
optimal  regional  strategies.  Amaney  A.  Jamal  has
claimed in his book entitled: Of Empires and Citizens
that "democracy may not suit the strategic interests of
the United States" in the Arab world [34]. The global
conflicts  against  global  communist  dictators  and
terrorism have sometimes meant that a Middle East
government's  softness  on  communism  or  on  terror
had  to  be  punished  or  prevented  or  nullified  by
subversive  means,  even  when  governments  were
relatively democratic. Furthermore, as seen in Table 8,
some of  the  pro-Soviet  regimes  (South  Yemen and
Sudan at the end of the 1960s, Iran 1951–1952) and
even  more  often  some  of  the  religiously  oriented
governments  that  have  had  a  sympathetic  attitude
towards  some  of  the  organizations  that  the  US
categorizes  as  terrorist  (Lebanon 1985,  Iran  in  the
2000s,  and  Sudan  today)  are  somewhat  less
autocratic in general than other regimes in the Middle
East. These regimes cannot win US support, as this
support,  even  if  positive  for  human security  in  the
Middle East, could hamper the American global fight
against  the  forces  of  autocracy.  Meanwhile,
governments with few democratic credentials can get
a favorable reception from the United States if they
have  a  favorable  attitude  towards  the  US  and  its
global allies.
A lesser, but still important intervening interest that
explains America's occasional support for repression,
is the US's support for the power, security and welfare
of Israel. Whether this support is due to the Second
World War's great narrative, which partly legitimizes
US  leadership  in  the  world,  or  to  the  extensive
domestic  power of  the American Jewish  community
[35], or to something else cannot be concluded on the
basis of this study. However, what can be said on the
basis of the analysis above is that the US has had to
help autocrats stay in power to support the strategic
goal of helping Israel. The case of marginalizing the
democratically elected Hamas in Palestine, instead of
trying to isolate it from the radicals involved in civilian
targeting, is a good example of this. The subversive
punishment of the Sudan in the mid-1960s and the
refusal  to endorse Iran's democratic development in
the 1980s and in the 1990s were partly related to the
upholding of this partisan support. Iran, obviously, did
not become a perfect democracy after its theocratic
revolution while the human security situation in the
country has deteriorated during the recent years. Yet,
according to Polity data, the country became one of
the most democratic and least autocratic countries in
the Middle East, and held that position even during
President  Bush's  campaign  against  tyrants  (Iranian
leaders included).
Although  claims  that  US  democracy  support  is
corrupted  by  oil  interests,  strategic  interests  of
resisting Islamism (and Iran),  the will  of  the US to
defend Israel are not new; these strategic interests,
as causal factors, had not been tested systematically
before this study. This is why there still are analyses
that assume, as a given, that the US influence overall
is in favor of democracy against totalitarian autocrats,
and that the question is just whether the US is doing
enough  to  support  democracy  [21,36].  This  study
together with my study of US reactions to changes of
polities [28] clearly show that the inaction of the US in
the Muslim Middle East during the Arab Spring would
be  more  beneficial  for  human  security  than  any
traditional US action. Thus we should not take it for
granted that  the democratic  superpower necessarily
has a positive effect on democracy in the Middle East.
The opposite is established here. The analysis above
suggests that the US has already done too much and
that  it  is  a  blessing  for  the  human  security  and
democracy  of  the  region  that  Barack  Obama's  US
administration is currently in retreat or less resolute in
supporting its autocratic Middle Eastern allies. Thus,
the  most  likely  conclusion  is  that  it  has  been  US
inaction rather than US action that contributed to Arab
Spring.
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What has been shown above is not proof that  it
was the US inaction that triggered the Arab Spring. It
is  obvious that  other factors were crucial.  However,
without the traditional weight of US influence in favor
of autocracy, the claim of US inaction giving rise to
the opportunities in the Arab world for people to oust
their autocrats would have been impossible to make.
The fact that there seems to be an overall balance of
US influence in favor of autocrats and that WikiLeaks
revealed the evaporation  of  US support  for  Ben Ali
makes it plausible that the US was, after all, somehow
behind the collapse of brutal autocrats in the Middle
East.  Whether this was actually the case should be
further  studied  by  tracing  the  motivations  of  the
democratic Arab rebels, their knowledge of and trust
in  WikiLeaks,  whether  their  facebook,  and  text
messages referred to the new opportunities offered by
the US inaction, and whether they talked about the
WikiLeaks  revelations.  Yet,  such  research  would  be
useless  before  it  can  be  shown  that  the  US  had
indeed supported autocracy and that this policy had
changed with Obama. This was proven in this study
(not that the US was necessarily an influence or that
WikiLeaks was the trigger).
The crucial oil states have not lost the support of
the US, and thus they have not managed to get rid of
their autocratic obstacles to human security. Instead
the  US tried  to  prevent  them from moving  against
autocracy both in Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. Thus
the change in the US attitude towards Islamist and
anti-Israel  popular  movements  could  be  among the
explanations of the Arab Spring. Also, this should be
further studied by focusing on the differences in the
US policies  towards oil  states  and non-oil  states.  If
there  were  a clear  difference between how the US
policy developed towards the two categories of states,
this could further consolidate the hypothesis that the
change in the US attitude towards potentially Islamist
non-oil  states  could have  been one of  the external
conditions of the Arab Spring. In any case, the fact
that  the  US used  to  support  autocrats,  and that  it
stopped this  support  for  autocrats  of  non-oil  states
just before the Arab Spring suggests that it is already
quite  plausible  that  the US change was  one of  the
causes of the Arab Spring, and that the revelation of
this  change  by  WikiLeaks  was  a  trigger  for
considerable human security upgrade in the region. In
any case, greater transparency early on about the US
support  of  autocracy,  despite  the  country's  pro-
democracy rhetoric, could have  increased the political
costs involved in this double standard decades ago.
This could have generated the international conditions
conducive for the Arab Spring even sooner.
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Appendix 1. US general support for the Middle East regimes.
Country US Support Neutrality US Opposition
Algeria 1979–2010
Bahrain 1971–2010
Egypt 1946–1952; 1979–2010
Iran 1953–1978
Iraq 1980–1988; 2003–2010 1946–1957; 1989 1958–1979; 1990–2002
Jordan 1957–1990; 1992–2010 1946–1956; 1991
Kuwait 1963–2010
Lebanon 1946–1958; 1983 1959–1982; 1984–2000; 
2005–2010
2001–2005
Libya 1952–1968; 2003–2010 1969–2002
Morocco 1956–2010
Oman 1973–2010 1946–1972
Qatar 1985–2010 1971–1984
Saudi Arabia 1946–2010
Sudan 1972–1973; 1977–1985 1956–1966; 1986–1988 1967–1971; 1974–1976; 
1989–2010
Syria 1949 1946–1948; 1950–1962; 
1970–1999
1963–1969; 2000–2010
Tunisia 1959–1984; 1986–1987; 
1992–2010
1985; 1988; 1990–1991
Turkey 1947–2010 1946
UAE 1971–2010
Yemen 1990–2004; 2006–2010 2005
Yemen, North 1962–1966; 1979–1990 1946–1961; 1973–1978 1967–1972
Yemen, South 1967–1968 1969–1990
Appendix 2. US military support for the Middle East regimes.
Country Military Cooperation No Military Cooperation
Algeria 1992–2010 1946–1991
Bahrain 1971–2010
Egypt 1979–2010 1946–1978
Iran 1953–1978 1946–1952; 1979–2010
Iraq 1980–1988; 2003–2010 1953–1978
Jordan 1957–2010 1946–1956
Kuwait 1991–2010 1973–1990
Lebanon 1950–1958; 1983 1946–1949; 1959–1982; 1984–2010
Libya 1951–2010
Morocco 1963–2010 1956–1962
Oman 1980–2010 1946–2007
Qatar 1992–2010 1971–1991
Saudi Arabia 1951–2010 1946–1950
Sudan 1972–1973 1956–1971; 1974–2010
Syria 1949; 1991 1946–1948; 1950–1990; 1992–2010
Tunisia 1959–2010
Turkey 1947–2010 1946
UAE 2001–2010 1971–2000
Yemen 2006–2010 1990–2005
Yemen, North 1979–1990 1946–1978
Yemen, South 1967–1990
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